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Two Approaches to Fashioning a Christian Perspective on the Liberal Market Order: A Symposium

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Arranged and edited by Edd S. Noell

Editors' Note: Faith & Economics *book review editor Edd S. Noell arranged this symposium to mark and reflect on the 2003 publication* Wealth, Poverty, and Human Destiny*, edited by Doug Bandow and David L. Schindler (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute. ISBN 1–882926–83–8, $29.95). The different perspectives reflected in the essays gathered here mirror the range of views in the Bandow and Schindler volume itself, and offer, we hope, some encouragement and stimulation in thinking about these important questions.*

Poverty, Freedom, and Economic Justice: The Need for An Extended Dialogue

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Alongside the extensive global dissemination of the "Washington Consensus" of privatization, market liberalization, and trade liberalization, fundamental challenges have surfaced for modern followers of Christ participating in the liberal market order. These challenges call for necessary deliberation and consequent responsible action in relation to the meaning and purpose of economic freedom, wealth, and poverty. In recent years, Christians struggling with the biblical mandate regarding wise and just stewardship of their possessions and the responsibility to minister to the poor have been led to consider again the compatibility of these particular ends with the ends served by the predominant forms of market-driven economic systems around the world. Does the liberal economic order produce genuine freedom to love and serve God and one's neighbor? Or is it rather inclined to generate greater temptations to absorption with material things that in turn leads to violation of the two great commandments by which Jesus summed up God's will? In like manner the phenomenon of globalization has led many believers to reexamine their responsibility towards the poorest of

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the poor in lesser-developed nations; what does the Lord's requirement to "do justice" (Micah 6:8) mean for Christians in the global marketplace? To address these and other similar challenges, the John Templeton Foundation and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute have come together to produce a volume of essays entitled *Wealth, Poverty, and Human Destiny* (hereafter referred to as *WPHD*). Among the issues considered are income inequality, the role of the family, the implications of changing technology for the human community and the environment, and the ramifications of globalization for living standards in less-developed countries. The ways in which *WPHD* addresses these concerns are considered in the essays which follow in this symposium. The purpose of this essay is to provide an overview of the structure of *WPHD*, to outline the central thrusts of the two main perspectives it presents, and briefly to evaluate how the volume treats the challenges related to poverty, economic freedom and justice.

The stated objective of *WPHD* is "to investigate whether and to what extent the market economy helps the poor" (p. vii). Editors Bandow and Schindler have each chosen a core group of contemporary Christian scholars to represent their particular take on this investigation. Included among them are economists, philosophers, and theologians who present their perspectives at some length in a volume of over five hundred pages. *WPHD* provides twelve core chapters, an additional chapter length summary and response by each editor, and two additional essays as appendices. The table below indicates the participants and the particular perspective with which they are aligned.

Market Economic Order Compatible with Christian Teaching (editor Doug Bandow)	Market Economic Order Incompatible with Christian Teaching (editor David L. Schindler)
P.J. Hill Michael Novak Samuel Gregg Jennifer Roback Morse Daniel T. Griswold Richard John Neuhaus	Adrian Walker D. Stephen Long William T. Cavanaugh David Crawford V. Bradley Lewis Arthur Davis
Appendix B: Max L. Stackhouse (with Lawrence M.Stratton)	Appendix A: Wendell Berry

Bandow's group asserts the superiority of market economies in lifting individuals out of material poverty. These authors find no essential

conflict between Christian teaching and the liberal market economic order, though several of them emphasize the necessity of a moral and democratic framework for capitalism. None of them explicitly identifies free market capitalism as God's sole prescription for ordering society's economic arrangements. Indeed, Bandow poses the question "Is capitalism Christian?" and responds "No. It neither advances human virtue nor corrects ingrained personal vices; it merely reflects them." Yet in a fallen world the collectivist approach of "socialism and its weaker statist cousins" are a much worse alternative, for they "exacerbate the worst of men's flaws" (p. 345). Addressing the tax and transfer system employed by the American mixed market economy, Hill argues that government efforts to redistribute income "change institutions in ways that hinder" the process of wealth creation (p. 15). Instead, the poor are better served by largely relying upon the voluntary efforts of the private sector. As Morse puts it, "we can build a free society by embracing those who are legitimately dependent on us," including children, the disabled and the elderly (p. 212). Among the market reforms needed to address global poverty, "secure rights to private property," "opening rich-country markets to poor country exports," and "reserving foreign aid for true emergencies" are key measures sorely needed (Griswold, pp. 236–239).

By contrast, Schindler's group finds the liberal economic order in fundamental tension with the Christian values of loving interdependence expressed in community. A different meaning of poverty is emphasized by these essayists. Liberal economics in itself is declared poor in the deepest spiritual sense. Thus Walker contends that "the techniques of liberal economic rationality" offer no real hope of solving the problem of material poverty (p. 50). Because of its grounding philosophically in an "abstract sense of personal self-identity," modern "instrumentalist economics" suffers from a "congenital" defect that renders a human being (as both producer and consumer) "homeless" (Schindler, pp. 353, 380, 412). That is, he is not rooted in "the relations that most profoundly constitute his being as a creature." The primary relation is the location of the creature made in the image of the Triune God (who exists in a loving community of three persons and one essence) in "abiding ontological community" with this God. Additionally, this central connection rightly gives him his place in the cosmos and also makes him intrinsically related "to all other entities of the world" (Schindler, pp. 351–353). In regards to economic matters, these relationships are genuinely expressed only by an "economy of love" (Schindler, p. 363) that centers economic relations in gratitude for God's intrinsically good gifts. An economic order grounded in gift and gratitude

offers the prospect of rightly addressing the problem of poverty and engendering true freedom. In the main Schindler's essayists contend that this will not require more active state intervention over economic activity; rather, as Cavanaugh puts it, "…the churches should take an active role in fostering economic practices that are consonant with the true ends of creation" (p. 128).

The broad theological framework out of which the essayists pursue their arguments about the nature of both market exchange and poverty should be noted. Several of the essayists in each group (most notably Novak, Neuhaus, Walker, Gregg, Crawford, Griswold, and Schindler) clearly acknowledge their dependence upon the magisterium of the Roman Catholic church. They readily appeal to the authority of papal statements on the market, particularly the pronouncements of John Paul II. Protestant readers will likely desire a foundation for a Christian perspective on markets centered more closely on the Scriptures. Those looking for a careful exegesis of the biblical material on poverty, freedom and justice that provides support for a Christian evaluation of market institutions will encounter some helpful discussion in Bandow's essay but will otherwise be largely disappointed. Nonetheless, almost all of the essays will likely stimulate Christian economists to think carefully about their understanding of such core concepts as poverty and freedom.

How one understands "freedom" certainly plays a key role in the arguments made in *WPHD*. This is evident in the argument stressing individual choice offered in defense of the market by Bandow's group. Novak draws upon John Gray's emphasis on the autonomy offered by the market order: "More than any other system, a market system enhances the individual's scope for and frequency of acts of choice" (p. 62). Morse also recognizes the modern American "need for autonomy" while affirming that "we can incorporate the needy into a vision of free and responsible individuals" (p. 179). Yet Schindler's group claims that the free market is not neutral towards the objective good; consequently it finds problematic the notion of the freedom of individuals in the market setting to choose wisely or poorly. Applying Augustine's understanding of freedom and desire, Cavanaugh contends participants in the market are not truly free but rather "subject to the arbitrary competition of wills" (p. 114). The practices of contemporary marketing exemplify for Cavanaugh "the unfreedom of the free market." Consumers may think themselves immune from advertising's "emotional bonds" and consequently free to choose among products. Yet in reality oligopolistic transnational corporations through marketing methods leverage "an imbalance of power" to shape

consumption patterns (pp. 116–118).

Here is a significant issue that needs to be given fuller treatment than what is afforded in *WPHD*. In a very brief response to Cavanaugh's critique of advertising, Bandow highlights examples of failed "multi-billion-dollar marketing campaigns" to counter the claim that transnational firms shape demand among consumers (p. 332). Yet one wishes for a further nuanced discussion of the meaning of economic freedom in light of the informational function provided by advertising. For example, would the freedom of parents be enhanced by a governmental ban on advertising of products aimed at children? Moreover, neither of the two main groups of authors considers the limited case for government regulation of advertising for particular categories of products. Such regulation is unnecessary for a hardback book, a ballpoint pen or a can of peas, which as search or experience goods have qualities that are easily determined before the consumer purchases these items. Advertising of these goods in fact would enhance consumer freedom in one sense. Yet a different evaluation could be offered in regards to advertising of credence goods, in which consumers aren't necessarily sure of the product's characteristics before or after consumption. Convincing arguments can be made that greater economic freedom in a certain sense would be fostered by prudent regulation of the provision and marketing of auto repairs, examinations by physicians, pharmaceuticals and other similar products.

The issue of economic justice in connection to the spread of market relations is another instance in which the discussion found in *WPHD* leaves one desiring to see an extended conversation. Certainly there is some consideration of different forms of economic justice. Griswold raises the connection between free trade and justice in the sense of the justness of trade "giving to each person sovereign control over that which is his own" (p. 215); Lewis briefly discusses Aristotle's concept of corrective justice (p. 249); Hill finds that efforts to accomplish distributive justice through governmental attempts to redistribute income "foster far greater injustices" (p. 1); and Bandow (pp. 318–319) asserts there is no biblical support for efforts to pursue equality of income (as an end presumably consistent with distributive justice). None of Bandow's group identifies with an extreme Christian libertarianism that only recognizes the need to satisfy commutative justice. Indeed, Gregg declares that "No seriously orthodox Christian is likely to claim that people have no responsibilities to others beyond contractual obligations" (p. 133).

A further consideration is needed of how Christians historically have wrestled with evaluating the nature and extent of these responsibilities

in connection to economic justice. For example, Gregg affirms that the spread of market activity throughout western Europe by the thirteenth century "was not problematic" for "the great majority of Christians" (p. 130). In fact it raised complex questions regarding how commerce could be conducted without sin which generated a dispute that even moved some to violence, as briefly noted by Gregg (p. 131). More importantly, scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas, Peter Olivi, Gerald Odonis and others thoughtfully examined the economic justice of particular kinds of transactions, developing parameters for establishing a just price and just wage. While there was increasing recognition of the benefits of trade, in that few cities or regions could be autarchies, warnings still remained regarding avarice and the activities of the merchant. Langholm (1992) notes the dilemma observed by the Schoolmen: "In order to make a profit, the merchant is tempted to cheat on weights and measures, to hide defects in his wares, to swear falsely about their qualities…" (pp. 573–574). Careful deliberation over the elements of justice in exchange was a practical necessity for the clerics of the Church. Consider the discussion in the penitential handbooks of economic justice in pricing as applied to merchants and consumers, in which the concept of injustice involving fraud was elaborated. Langholm (2003) provides some specific instances:

> From the thirteenth century, few handbooks that dealt at any length with economic subjects, would fail to mention weights and measures. Elaborations appeared, and many other fraudulent tricks were added: using different scales for buying and for selling, making one arm of the scales longer than the other, counting falsely, selling bad for good, a worthless substance for a precious one, a sick horse for a healthy one, rotten meat for fresh, soaking wool and certain spices to make them heavier, diluting wine or otherwise adulterating and mixing liquid goods, counterfeiting, clipping or otherwise mutilating coins, etc. These are all examples of deliberate, intentional fraud (p. 238).

Further matters of fair bargaining and consent were taken up in Scholastic sermons and theological treatises; by recognizing the ways in which costs, location, risk and economic incentive allowed for variations in the just price as a "common estimate," the Scholastics framed their discussion of economic justice in terms sympathetic to market outcomes that were achieved in the absence of fraud and coercion. At the same time, in applying their formulation of a just wage doctrine, they exhorted employers to pay their workers promptly and in line with the Golden Rule expressed in Matthew 7:12. The purpose of *WPHD* to evaluate markets would be more

fully served by further reflection on these facets of Christian thought on economic justice.

Much of *WPHD* may leave a Christian economist desiring a more extended conversation with the authors about whether and how markets serve the biblical ends of love and justice. In addition, as other participants in the symposium note, it will likely leave the reader wishing for a direct dialogue on these matters between the authors representing the Bandow and Schindler groups. Yet it represents a significant contribution to the ongoing scholarly evaluation of the ends served by markets. It serves a noteworthy purpose in adding to a discussion in which Christian economists must continue to be engaged.

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The Market Economy and Human Community

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W*ealth, Poverty and Human Destiny* presents a dialogue, of sorts, between Christian representatives of, first, a market-affirming "liberalism" and, second, a form of conservatism that is quite skeptical toward markets as the basis for economic interaction. This line-up of opposing arguments is likely to strike many readers as rather unusual in our day and age, when strong support for markets is often considered part of the right wing of the ideological landscape, while opposition to market mechanisms is viewed as a defining feature of the left. Those with some historical awareness will recall, however, that the political species we Americans are now apt to call libertarians were once called liberals and even radicals. Indeed, here in Europe they are often still known as liberals, although certainly not as leftists.

The root meaning of "liberal" is, of course, free or freedom, and economic liberals have been those who advocate and promote the economic freedom of the individual against the restrictions imposed by both state

power and tradition. What "conservatives" have sought to conserve in the face of such liberalism has varied. Often enough, it has been state-supported privilege—vested interests that have stifled economic initiative to the detriment of economic growth and welfare on a wider scale. This sort of conservatism is what Adam Smith chiefly opposed in his day, and it is what Smith's disciples have opposed in latter-day kleptocracies and socialist states.

There is, however, a quite different sort of economic conservatism, one that has opposed economic liberalism and individualism because of their disruptive effect on human relationships and community. One of the prominent early representatives of this conservatism was the British essayist and historian Thomas Carlyle, perhaps best known to us for naming our field the "dismal science." In his 1839 essay *Chartism*, Carlyle lamented that

> Cash Payment [has] grown to be the universal sole nexus of man to man…. Cash payment the sole nexus; and there are so many things which cash will not pay! Cash is a great miracle; yet it has not all power in Heaven, nor even in Earth. "Supply and demand" we will honour also; and yet how many "demands" are there, entirely indispensable, which have to go elsewhere than to the shops, and produce quite other than cash, before they can get their supply!

Carlyle saw the *homo economicus* of our theory put into practice as people came to appear to each other as "buyer and seller alone," losing the capacity for the non-market human transactions that enrich our life. To be sure, few today will be drawn to the alternative that Carlyle commended: a romanticized, quasi-medieval social structure of deference and paternalism. Yet his lament still resonates in our own experience, and one hears a distant echo of it in many critiques of markets, including those within the pages of this book.

A more direct and obvious influence on the market-skeptical essays in this volume is the century-long tradition of Roman Catholic reflection on the market economy and the socialist alternative, particularly as this reflection has been presented in the papal encyclicals of 1891 through 1991. Leo XIII started it all with *Rerum Novarum*, a response to the "new things" of modern industrial capitalism and the industrial proletariat. The pope promoted an alternative vision of a modern economy, one rooted in the Catholic tradition of a distinctively Christian social order, harmonious and participatory even if unavoidably marked by differences in status, wealth, and power. He expressly advocated labor unions as a means of

voice, participation, and pursuit of economic security for the working class, even while he ruled out the class warfare being fostered by the rising Marxian labor movement.

Rerum Novarum was followed by *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931 (literally "in the fortieth year" after the previous encyclical) as the world economy was reaching the depths of the Great Depression. This encyclical specifically endorsed a mixed economy with a substantial government sector. Fifty years later, in 1981, *Laborem Exercens* offered John Paul II's reflection on the meaning and dignity of human labor and the potential for the abuse of this dignity both in market economies and, especially, in socialist economies. Finally, John Paul II marked the hundredth year of the series with *Centesimus Annus*, notable particularly for its very positive reflections upon the effects of markets and economic individualism while still setting forth a Catholic communitarian perspective and rejecting stronger forms of laissez-faire individualism.

In *WPHD*, Schindler chooses contributors who share one or another version of this communitarian perspective. He himself is a Catholic professor of theology, and most of his slate of contributors are also theologians. On the other hand, Bandow chooses market-affirming contributors from the ranks of (more or less) libertarian economists and theologically astute, neoconservative social critics including Novak and Neuhaus. Bandow is himself a policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute.

I. The Arguments

As is often the case in such a mixed company of contributors, the arguments of the different sides often fail to meet head on. The libertarian economists are more systematic in their evidence; the communitarian theologians more anecdotal and more apt to assert general claims without specific evidence. Both sides link empirical claims to moral arguments, but these are largely different sorts of arguments. Several of the economists, notably Hill and Griswold, along with the co-editor Bandow, compare the effectiveness of markets to that of socialism and other forms of statism in generating wealth and alleviating poverty. They thus address two of the three elements of the book's title well enough, but they have much less to say about the third element, human destiny. The communitarians have nothing positive to say about socialism and statism—they are offering a conservative critique, not a leftist one—but they have much to say about human destiny and about the consonance (or rather lack of consonance) of the market economy with human nature as understood by Christians.

They propose, of course, that an economy more in keeping with human nature and the nature of human community would also do better at meeting human needs.

The pro-market side as a whole does not neglect the issues of human destiny and human nature, however. Griswold celebrates markets as cultivating virtue. Novak offers a theological defense of "democratic capitalism" as the best context for the exercise of human subjectivity and creativity, solidarity and community, generating dynamic growth that has liberated many people from poverty. Gregg, moral philosopher at the Christian libertarian Acton Institute, presents a particularly astute reflection on economic individualism from a Christian perspective, including from the perspective of *Centesimus Annus*. Markets, he argues, provide the context for the proper exercise of human autonomy. Morse gives particular attention to the need to "humanize" the market economy, tempering radical individualism with concern and care for those who are legitimately needy and dependent. In her view, a free society should support the freedom, dignity, and prosperity of all, not only of those capable of making an economic contribution and thus being rewarded by the market.

The dominant theme of the communitarian argument is that a free-market economy is inescapably intertwined with a faulty understanding of human nature and destiny, and that it therefore promotes an instrumentalist or utilitarian treatment of the human person at the expense of community, love, and human fulfillment. According to Schindler, true community is based on gift and gratitude, while the self-interest promoted by the liberal economy destroys such community and leads to a deep sense of "homelessness." "Liberal economic rationality does not work," writes Walker. "And it does not work because it is not formed in Christ's poverty of spirit" (p. 50), but rather in a faulty view of rational economic behavior that results in a faulty calculation of profit and welfare. A liberal economy may have some success for a time, according to Walker, because it draws parasitically on virtues that have their source elsewhere. But the liberal economy continually undermines these virtues, leading eventually to its own demise as well.

The problem with the freedom of the free market, according to Cavanaugh, is that the freedom may be used for sinful and destructive ends as well as for virtuous and constructive ones; the market values one as well as the other. Long attributes Adam Smith's reliance on self-interest and his metaphor of the invisible hand to Smith's "implicit theology" (p. 100), the Stoic doctrine of providence in seeing human vices as well as virtues contribute to the ultimate good of the whole. Crawford joins

in the critique of Smithian self-interest, arguing that "non-self-interested communitarian relations" (p. 157) are another important feature of human action that liberalism does not take into account. He points to a broader range of motivations in family life, religious communities, and other relationships: "Realistically, it would seem, all human relations contain some 'mixture' of self-interest and disinterest. Presumably, then, even economic exchange relations could contain a 'nobler and deeper' element" (p. 159).

II. The Communitarian Economy in Theory and Practice

So how would an economy based on such principles work in practice? Is it a viable, realistic alternative to the economy we have today? Several of the communitarian authors bristle at the charge that they have no realistic program to put their ideals into practice. They have obviously heard such criticism often, although it is strangely absent in the pro-market writings of the present volume. The economists here applied their criticisms more to socialism and statism, the alternatives of the left, rather than specifically to the views of the communitarians. This is a fault in the conception of the book. Perhaps the pro-market contributors were insufficiently briefed about the views of their dialogue partners, or perhaps they lack the imagination to understand and respond to a critique of the market other than from the political left.

At least some of the communitarians indeed lack a realistic program—an alternative, presumably, to the market as a means of organizing and structuring value-producing economic interaction. Co-editor Schindler calls in his concluding reflections for "an economy of gift and gratitude" (p. 349) expressly different from Adam Smith's vision of the market economy. In Smith's famous words,

> It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages (cited by Crawford, p. 156).

For Schindler, by contrast, such a transaction reduces the production process, the good produced, and both parties in the transaction to mere instruments of and for profit. Much better, he argues, is another approach:

> The baker who works for the sake of love—however much he may or may not conceive of what he is doing explicitly in theoretical terms—approaches the making of bread, the bread made, the other

> for whom the bread is made, and indeed himself as invested in the process and the thing, as a gift. He makes the bread—which is to say, he gratefully gives himself over to the making of the bread—simultaneously for its own sake and for the sake of another (p. 362).

Perhaps we can all agree that it is good for any worker to value one's work as a means of serving some human need rather than simply of earning a paycheck. Nevertheless we might doubt that it is realistic to expect workers to have the vision and energy to "work for the sake of love" (p. 362), particularly if, unlike Smith's baker, they have no direct connection to the end beneficiary of their labor and perhaps even no clear idea of what end products—what consumer goods— their labor is helping to produce. But even if we did accept Schindler's argument, how is it an argument against the liberal market economy? What is there in markets that presents people from working thus? What is the realistic form of an alternative economic structure that promotes the labor of love more than markets do?

If there is an alternative to the market economy with its frequently anonymous transactions, then it is something like the medieval village where economic transactions are all face-to-face. But that is an economy without an extensive division of labor and the economies of scale that that brings—without, that is, Smithian gains from trade. It is an economy without extensive long-distance commerce, either within a country or internationally, and without the resulting opportunities to benefit from differences in regional comparative advantage—without, that is, Ricardian gains from trade. The alternative to an integrated market economy based on anonymous transactions is, indeed, an economy where deep regional poverty and periodic famine are much more widespread, and where material standards of living even in richer regions are far closer to those of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa than to those of even the less-well-off modern industrial economies.

A modern economy requires anonymous transactions. Moreover, any economy that is to function tolerably well requires the coordination of production with consumption. This happens through the transmission of information and incentives—information about shortfalls in supply over against demand, and incentives to draw in the entrepreneurial energy and labor that can fill the gap. As we economists well know, this transmission of information and incentives is the essential economic function of free price formation in markets. Socialist economies, which sought to institutionalize an economy of love using state power, proved immensely

wasteful of resources and unable to satisfy consumer wants precisely because they lacked such a mechanism. Similarly, a non-statist economy of love, gift, and gratitude simply cannot manage without markets. No matter how much one may love, one cannot have sufficient, detailed information about the concrete needs that one's labor can satisfy except by reference to markets and freely formed prices. Economic action on the basis of incentives—indeed of profit opportunities—is a proper response to one's finite knowledge about how to serve others. It is much more than a response, proper or not, to one's individualistic desire for personal gain.

Schindler and several of his contributors show no appreciation for the practical problems that any economy-wide institutions, markets or otherwise, must at a minimum address. However, one of the communitarian writers, Walker, does present a program that is at least worth some attention. It is not exactly a program for comprehensive institutional change—a change in the "rules of the game" of the market economy at the national and international level. Rather, it is a program for change in local institutions and for the accommodation of these institutions at higher levels.

Walker emphasizes that what he favors is not a socialist or statist solution but rather a decentralized one. Indeed, much of his critique of the market is that it gives rise to centralized corporate control of the economy that mirrors in some respects the faults of centralized political control:

> Let us be frank: the charge of "unrealism" is often a thinly veiled unwillingness or inability to imagine an economy driven by a set of priorities other than the ones already in place. I am not arguing that the government take over the production and distribution of goods and services. But today the specter of a centrally planned economy is a red herring. Not only does the liberal economy have a symbiotic relationship with the state; it also unduly favors the concentration of economic power in big corporations (who else can maintain economies of scale?) that, allied with technology, have a massively disproportionate influence on many aspects of daily life, from the average citizen's access to the news to the scientist's research in his university's laboratory. What I am arguing for is precisely that we turn our efforts towards a decentralization of economic power in favor of the locality, the scale of which allows for genuine political deliberation about the most efficient use of resources without the coercion involved in central planning. Of course there must still be a national and international market, but these higher levels must be structured so that the input of subsidiary political units, for example the city, are allowed to protect the individual from the encroachments

> of big government, big business, and for that matter, big media (p. 43).

Walker's proposal is not specific enough to critique in detail, because he does not offer a real case either for the supposedly massive influence of big corporations on daily life, particularly in limiting people's economic opportunities, or for the possibilities of local political units to counteract such influence. I venture to doubt that he or anyone else can make such a case. In a free market economy without special privileges, big corporations can propose, but they cannot impose. They can offer buying opportunities, investments in production facilities, funds for research in university laboratories, and much else, but these are actions that generally expand—not limit—people's opportunities, and people are in any case free to reject them. Big corporations do, of course, introduce new competition to localities, which both expands opportunities for consumers (or workers) and reduces opportunities for the local competitors.

Where communitarians like Walker do have a case is in the fact that change is disruptive to the existing economic structure and social fabric, and this disruption does have negative (as well as positive) effects. The coming of Walmart brings the demise of Main Street, precisely because consumers vote with their feet and with their dollars, preferring the advantages of price and selection to whatever "economy of gift and gratitude" (p. 349) there may be in buying from the small shop of one's neighbor. There may sometimes be a role for local politics in opposing or mitigating such disruption, but this is hardly a departure from the current structure of economic and political institutions. Furthermore, as some of the libertarians in this volume point out, the political process often supports particular local vested interests rather than the general public good.

Another of the communitarians, Cavanaugh, points to another alternative that is sometimes indeed demonstrably practical: the founding of new communitarian organizations that participate within the existing, larger-scale institutions of the market. He specifically discusses the example of the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation, founded by a priest in 1956 in the Basque region of Spain. Worker-owned and -governed, it employs 60,000 in a range of manufacturing pursuits. The Mondragon project is based on the papal encyclicals and more specifically on distributism, the ideal of the widest possible ownership of property, popularized early in the twentieth century by G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. "At Mondragon, they believe that labor hires capital, instead of capital labor" (p. 123), writes Cavanaugh. "For Belloc—and much of the Catholic tradition on

property going back to Aquinas—the ownership of property is natural to human beings and allows them to develop their own capacities. Property is thus essential to human freedom" (p. 125).

A Christian supporter of markets can join the communitarians in applauding the Mondragon project, and indeed one can wish for more projects like it. Widespread ownership of property, including specifically workers' ownership and control of their own productive capital, is indeed to be desired. Such projects do require substantial entrepreneurial initiative, however, as was exercised by the Mondragon priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta. Such projects cannot be mandated or imposed by any central authority; they can only arise locally through the ideological convictions of organizers and workers that the projects are worthwhile. If such projects are truly viable, we can expect them to flourish within the larger institutional setting of markets. Indeed, in the United States, worker cooperatives receive special tax advantages.

Economic progress requires entrepreneurship—the pursuit of opportunities for gain (in our context, the pursuit of profit opportunities arising within markets). As economists will quickly appreciate, there are quite substantial transaction costs—costs of persuading and organizing—involved in establishing a worker cooperative. Many workers seem to prefer the separation of ownership from labor supply. The problem with socialism, as Oscar Wilde is supposed to have said, is that it leaves one with no free evenings. The relative rarity of worker cooperatives is probably a good indication that these transaction costs are prohibitive, that is, that worker cooperatives are generally less efficient than the more common sort of entrepreneurship that hires labor (and that indeed hires capital as well).

An economy of love and gift and gratitude is impossible on a large scale, but it can flourish on a small scale among friends and neighbors and in voluntary communities. Within families (Gary Becker notwithstanding), the socialist ideal is commonly realized: from each according to one's ability, to each according to one's need. In religious communities—local congregations, orders, occasionally communes, and other groupings—a similar brotherly sharing may flourish, sometimes to the point of voluntary socialism. Secular socialist *kibbutzim* have also proved viable, although only for about two generations before participants lose their motivating ideology. But as twentieth-century history amply shows, it is not possible to institutionalize an economy of love on a larger scale or on a non-voluntary basis. Even to attempt to do so requires coercion and, indeed, totalitarian suppression of the individual.

The Christian communitarians represented in this volume do not want anything like that, of course. Quite the contrary. But they need to be clearer about what it is that they do want—what specific changes in economic institutions or what specific new forms of organizations to participate in the existing institutions of the market economy. They need serious economic analysis to address how these institutions and organizations would operate, and how they could be started. Until they do address these matters, they are indeed utopians.

III. The Technological Imperative and the Market

One theme of several of the communitarians in this volume, including Schindler and Walker, is that the market economy is tied up with the oppressive dominance of technology over people. Davis devotes an entire essay to this theme by introducing the thought of George Grant, a Canadian "red Tory" (that is, conservative social democrat) academic and public figure of the 1950s to 1980s. Grant comes across here as something of a North American Jacques Ellul. In Grant's thought, capitalism has been wedded to technological science throughout the modern era in together pursuing the mastery of nature, including specifically human nature. It is a widespread delusion, according to Grant, to see technology as solving all our problems and eventually making everyone free, equal, and prosperous. Rather, he sees technology as foreclosing important possibilities as well as opening them. The coming culmination of this, according to Grant, is a "cost-benefit analysis of human life" that brings tyranny in denying "the rights of the unborn and of the aged,…the mentally retarded, the insane and the economically less privileged" (cited in Davis, p. 282). Grant's alternative, as much as one can make out from Davis's essay, is, first, to question the assumptions behind optimistic beliefs about progress through technological science; second, to hold to universal moral truths in the face of supposedly value-free but actually often immoral science; and ultimately to recognize that "we are not our own," that our essence as human beings is not in a freedom to do as we please but rather in our creatureliness.

Interestingly, pro-market contributor Neuhaus briefly offers a partly similar view of technology, although not of its connection to capitalism:

> One still hears it said that science and technology are neutral, capable of being used for either good or evil, and there is an important measure of truth in that. Increasingly, however, it is recognized that science and technology take on a life of their own, moving ahead step by step in obedience to a dogma of progress…. Efforts to check

> or hold accountable that apparently inexorable movement require a renewal of the political (p. 305).

By the political, Neuhaus means, “free persons deliberating the question of how we ought to live our lives together” (p. 304). The specific areas of false “progress” that Neuhaus argues should be held accountable to deliberation—specifically to moral deliberation—are “reproductive technologies, cloning, eugenics, and related developments.” Neuhaus compares “the threatening totalitarianism of science and technology” to “the ideas of economic determinism that drove the socialist totalitarianism of the past century,” and he sees the new threat as one that “Catholic social doctrine must more effectively confront” (p. 305).

I am in sympathy with the view of both Grant and Neuhaus that a sometimes destructive technological imperative exists, although I am not persuaded that it is nearly so pervasive as Grant (or for that matter Jacques Ellul) seems to have thought. There remains the question of how this technological imperative is connected to the market economy. At the most basic and direct level, the market economy offers greater scope than other social systems for all sorts of profitable economic initiative, including both for highly beneficial developments and for projects that ultimately prove destructive of human values. (We will not dwell here on the beneficial role of the market economy in unleashing positive technological creativity. This is a familiar theme, included even in the writings of Marx, but it received only brief attention in this volume.) When Neuhaus calls for a “renewal of the political” (p. 305) and the introduction of moral considerations, he is implicitly calling for the imposition of restrictions upon market outcomes. Libertarian co-editor Bandow tacitly accepts this. As economists, we should perhaps say that the justification for intervention here is moral externalities.

The connection between the market economy and the technological imperative runs deeper, however, than the scope for action afforded by free markets. Grant is correct in seeing a connection as old as modernity itself, but I would argue that this connection is more a matter of common roots than of continuing collaboration. The great theme of modernity—and of its twin sibling liberalism—is that of pursuing a better future through freedom of action and the rational application of means to ends. Since early modern times this has given birth to a great many things: to modern technological science; to liberal economics in both theory and practice; to socialist economics; to a host of political programs ranging from constitutional democracy to totalitarian communism; to rationalist skepticism toward

received morality, social institutions, and religious teaching; to the myriad cultural artifacts of modernism; and finally to a skeptical reaction against modernity and liberalism itself—what we know as postmodernism and postliberalism. The fruits of modernity and liberalism have been varied indeed. There has been much to applaud and much else to condemn. Often it has been unrestrained instrumentalism—the swallowing up of the human person in the rationalistic application of means to ends—that has had the worst effects, whether in politics, economics, technology, or culture. What has chiefly distinguished the positive from the negative manifestations of modernity and liberalism has been an acknowledgement of limits: limits resulting from human finitude and problems of information, limits to human moral perfectibility, and limits to what humans ought to do to each other and to nature. The continuing value of moral absolutes, and indeed of revealed religion, has been proved again and again.

IV. Christianity and Liberalism

The most profound reflection in *WPHD* is that of Neuhaus in an essay chiefly about the liberalism of John Paul II. More than anyone else (although Novak and Morse come close), Neuhaus recognizes that the relevant issue for the economic and social order today is not one of whether conservatism or liberalism should prevail, but rather a question of what kind of liberalism will prevail.

Neuhaus notes that liberalism "is a wondrously pliable term," applicable to the most extreme laissez-faire libertarianism, "the republican liberalism of virtue," and "the communitarian liberalism of Tocquevillian civil society" (p. 291), among others. Schindler and other conservative critics lump all this together, according to Neuhaus, and associate it all with their indictment of capitalism. In Neuhaus's paraphrase of this indictment,

> Liberal dogma and market dynamics are the mutually reinforcing foundation and end of a social order that is entirely and without remainder in the service of individualistic choices by the sovereign, autonomous, and unencumbered Self. The wages of liberalism is consumerism, and consumerism is all-consuming. The end result is what some critics call "liberal totalitarianism" (p. 293).

By contrast, Neuhaus commends John Paul II's *Centesimus Annus* as an invaluable guide to what is valuable and what is faulty in liberalism. The pope credited modernity and liberalism for developing an understanding of the individual and individual freedom. As a consequence for our thinking, according to Neuhaus,

> It is a mistake to pit, as some do pit, modern individualism against a more organic Catholic understanding of community. Rather should we enter into a sympathetic liaison with the modern achievement of the idea of the individual, grounding it more firmly and richly in the understanding of the person destined from eternity to eternity for communion with God. The danger of rejecting individualism is that the real-world alternative is not a Catholic understanding of *communio* but a falling back into the collectivisms that are the great enemy of the freedom to which we are called (p. 296).

In the view of Neuhaus, *Centesimus Annus* achieved a fruitful and realistic synthesis between the ideals of liberal individualism and those of conservative communitarianism. This is a synthesis that affirms the value of the human person over against all oppression.

Neuhaus argues further, following the pope, that liberal individualism cannot ultimately be protected by the legacy of modernity. Rather, it can be preserved only by the recognition that "the individual, the family, and society are prior to the State" (John Paul II, cited by Neuhaus, p. 300) and that the state is subject to a higher authority. Without such a recognition, the modernist-liberal project of social change ultimately gives way to oppression. Neuhaus writes, "The unlimited state, whether based on Marxist atheism or the engineering designs of Enlightenment rationalism, aspires to totalitarian control" (p. 300). In the pope's words, "As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism" (cited by Neuhaus, p. 302).

The battle today is over the soul of liberalism.

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Capitalism, Wealth and Poverty: How Should Christians Evaluate the Liberal Economic Order and its Consequences?

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Given the apparent historical triumph of capitalism, how should Christians react? Some view market capitalism as incompatible with Christian moral and social teaching, blaming it for contributing to income inequality and poverty. Others defend capitalism because it, more than any other economic system, facilitates wealth creation

and has enabled millions to escape from poverty. Christians continue to differ in their views about the role that the state should play in redistributing income and promoting justice in labor markets.

How should Christians evaluate the liberal (free-market) economic order? Does it contribute to human flourishing or is it a system that is fundamentally flawed? Is capitalism an integral part of a system by which technology masters human nature rather than serving human needs? These and other important issues are debated in *WPHD*. Half of the authors argue that a free-market economic system is beneficial to the poor and essentially compatible with Christian teaching. The remaining essayists view the dominant capitalist economic order as inherently flawed. They "regard it as depending on a philosophical liberalism that is not neutral but fundamentally opposed to Christian theology and social thought" (p. viii).

Bandow lists some of the important economic questions considered by the essays. What explains the prevalence of poverty and inequality in a world of growing wealth? Does free market capitalism help or hurt the poor and powerless? The essays also raise questions about the amount and nature of freedom that is desirable as well as the appropriate institutions and regulations that should be used to facilitate and constrain freedom.

Bandow's group of authors construe contemporary open, market economic systems as generally good for the poor. In their essay Stackhouse and Stratton assert that "the 'free market' usually provides the best opportunity for individual human development and for increasing social participation of groups living in poverty" (p. 431). Schindler's group of authors generally disagree with the above statements. They raise questions about what are appropriate goals for an economic system, the anthropology implicit in the liberal economic order, and whether its outcomes are just. In a summary essay, Schindler challenges the views of the first group of authors, raising questions about the meaning of key terms, such as "open," "good," "free," "poverty" and "social participation" (p. 348).

This review discusses some of the consequences of the liberal economic order in light of the essays in *WPHD*, with particular emphasis on whether free markets benefit the poor or result in widespread poverty and injustice. In discussing wealth and poverty, some of the authors not only consider the question of how to raise the living standards of those who suffer material poverty, but they also discuss the conditions that lead to ontological "poverty," the lack of meaningful participation in society. Several of the critics of capitalism question the very conceptions of wealth and poverty

that are prevalent in the liberal market economy. This review essay also considers the argument that the liberal market order, with its emphasis on freedom, results in a technological dynamic that impoverishes us all by fragmenting people's relationships to God, others and the environment.

The remainder of this essay is divided into three parts. The next section considers the problems of poverty and income inequality and what role the state should play in relation to the market in addressing these problems. Following that I discuss the relationship between capitalism, technology, and the environment and how that influences human wellbeing. The concluding section ties the issues together in addressing the broader question of the compatibility of Christian thought with an economic order based on free markets.

I. Wealth, Poverty, and Inequality

In the first essay, Hill presents the case for a system of limited government in which the distribution of wealth is the result of free exchange in the market. His argument has three components. First, concern for material inequality is a harmful distortion "of an appropriate and laudable human motive, a desire to help the infirm, the suffering, and the unfortunate" (p. 1). Second, redistribution of income requires inequality of political power, which is a source of far greater injustices than income inequality. Third, redistribution involves structuring the rules that govern economic interaction in such a way as to inhibit wealth creation, which is the most important means of poverty amelioration.

Hill uses public choice theory and evidence as the basis for a convincing argument against redistribution of income by means of government programs. Evidence shows that economic growth has resulted in reduced poverty in those parts of the world where there is "strong but limited government that enforces the rule of law, freedom of contract and private property rights" (p. 13). He does not deny that those who are well off have a responsibility to help those who are less fortunate, but emphasizes that wealth creation is the best way to fulfill that responsibility.

A very different view is expressed by Long, who emphasizes the poverty and inequality that result from the exploitative practices of some corporations. He argues that Christianity "must continue to be open to socialism in a way that it cannot be open toward capitalism" (p. 101). Long describes two corporations to help explain how theology might inform an understanding of economic exchanges. The first corporation he describes operates a lobster and shrimp plant off the coast of Honduras. The workers

earn only 75 cents per hour, resulting in a tremendous disparity between their living standards and that of the owners of the plant. He concludes that this corporation is unjust, engaging in what are obviously corrupt practices. The second corporation that he describes treats its employees well and contributes much to the community in which its plant is located.

There are two problems with the views of capitalism and justice presented by Long. First is the question of what constitutes injustice. Referring to the example of the lobster and shrimp plant, Bandow argues that the disparity in wealth between the owners of a firm and its workers is not necessarily proof of injustice. Long assumes that the wickedness of this corporation should be obvious to all, but does not specify any standard by which to identify corrupt practices or unjust wages. The Scripture nowhere specifies a standard of justice that is based on abstract income and wealth distribution. While Colossians 4:1 seems to imply that workers should be paid fair wages, large disparities in income and wealth might be defensible based on differences between what the owners and workers contribute to the enterprise, including the amount of money invested and the risks taken. While agreeing that the poverty of the workers is unacceptable, Bandow points out that the situation calls for charity, arguing that the rich factory owners have an obligation to be generous to their poor neighbors. The owners' possession of wealth, however, does not necessarily mean "that they have sinned in their economic relations" (p. 334).

Long is critical of "Adam Smith's stoic theology" that views the kind of exchanges found in the lobster plant as a "social fact." This stoic theology leads some "to accept the idea that there is an economic providence intrinsic to social reality whereby sacrifices are required by some for the sake of a future development that will justify those sacrifices" (p. 100). He contrasts Smith's theology with Catholic social teaching and its commitment to the just wage and the concept of intrinsic evils. The flaw in Long's analysis here is that he attributes the low wages of the workers to the actions of the owners of the corporation, rather than the lack of alternative economic opportunities. By implying that the corporation is to blame for the poverty of the workers, Long fails to consider the possibility that the decision of the plant owners to invest in an area where there is such poverty likely raises the workers' living standards.

The second problem with Long's exposition of inequality and injustice is his view that socialism might make it possible to substitute "a noncompetitive system in which the interests of owners, shareholders, and workers need not—by some necessity of a natural social fact—be pitted against each other" (p. 101). This is a utopian view that reflects

a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, scarcity, socialism, and capitalism. As Bandow notes, "socialism, by concentrating power and surrendering the economy to political control, intensifies social competition and conflict"(p. 312). While socialism relies upon coercion, cooperation between owners of capital and workers characterizes a free market economy. In a free market, owners of a business firm are not likely to be very successful in the long run if they see themselves as competing with their workers.

Cavanaugh in "The Unfreedom of the Free Market" argues for a positive definition of freedom that goes beyond the opportunity to engage in informed voluntary exchange. Freedom should be evaluated by some standard of human flourishing and the ends of human life, a standard that is violated, when, for example, a worker is paid less than a living wage. Rather than advocating state direction of economic activity, he believes that churches should take an active role in fostering economic practices that are consonant with the true ends of creation.

Cavanaugh's critique of capitalism emphasizes the disproportionate power that corporations have compared to workers. Yet, as Bandow points out, corporations face a variety of constraints on their power, such as the need for highly trained employees and the importance of a stable political and legal environment. Paradoxically, it is the power of corporations to shift production in response to cost differences that benefits some of the poorest workers in the poorest nations.

The relation between capitalism and poverty implied by both Walker and Schindler raises some fundamentally different questions. Walker notes that a chronic condition of poverty "does not consist primarily in a lack of material goods," but "in a lack of meaningful participation" in the "communion of giving and receiving that alone can unlock for the individual the wealth of his being as a person" (p. 33).

The notion of poverty discussed by Walker and Schindler relates to questions about the nature of capitalism, technology, and the relation of humans to their physical environment. These issues are what primarily concern Berry in his essay that is included in the appendix. The role and consequences of technology were also of concern to George Grant, whose ideas are summarized in an essay by Davis.

II. Capitalism, Technology, and the Environment

Grant, a Canadian moral and political philosopher, was concerned about the "need for order or limits in a world that had embraced human freedom in the form of technological science," and "corporate power as the means

of improving the human condition" (p. 272). Grant viewed the state as an essential instrument in the effort to counterbalance corporate power, maintain order, and preserve Christian culture.

In Grant's view, technology is not neutral. Technology and capitalism have mastered nature, including human nature. North American civilization has fallen prey to the delusion that technology will solve all our problems and eventually make everyone free, equal, and prosperous. Legalized abortion illustrates the failure of liberalism to protect humans from the imperatives of technology.

Neuhaus also recognizes some of the dangers associated with science and technology that have taken on a life of their own. He does not view the amoral application of technology as an inevitable consequence of capitalism, but instead sees an important role for political deliberation to restrain technology and hold people accountable to use it for moral purposes.

Berry is concerned with the attitude toward nature that is exemplified in the way that modern technology is used. The "environmental crisis" results from the human household or economy being in conflict with the household of nature. Rather than imitating natural processes, the modern capitalist system views nature as a source of supply of raw materials to be mined.

Berry is critical of the role played by the corporation in our modern economy. We give proxies to corporations to produce and provide all of our food, clothing, and shelter. Corporations and governments are expected to provide services that were once made available informally and inexpensively by households or communities. The environmental crisis does not stem from our surroundings but from our failure to take economic responsibility for how our lives impact the natural, God-given world.

We live in an era of sentimental capitalism, which holds that "everything small, local, private, personal, natural, good, and beautiful must be sacrificed in the interest of the 'free market' and the great corporations which will bring unprecedented security and happiness" in the future (p. 417). This process is exemplified in agricultural and land policy. The U.S. government has contributed to the problems of agriculture, which Berry characterizes as high costs and low prices resulting in waves of farm failures, the enlargement of destitution and the degradation of the countryside.

There are some important truths in Berry's critique, but it also includes some major errors. While Berry is correct in his assertion that government agricultural policy has not helped farmers, he does not accurately describe

the farm problem. In spite of the failures of agricultural policy, the incomes of most farm families have been rising over time. While Berry implies that economic conditions have forced many people out of their chosen vocation of agriculture, he does not provide evidence that former farmers and descendants of farmers are less satisfied with their current jobs than they were as farmers. Most of those who have left farming earn more for their labor than they or their ancestors earned in agriculture.

As Bandow notes, Berry's essay reflects "profound philosophical and spiritual unease with modern economies" (p. 336). His concerns about the disruption that a dynamic capitalist economy brings to local communities deserve serious reflection. His proposed solutions, however, are neither realistic nor desirable. He calls for extensive government intervention through progressive income taxes, stronger labor unions, stronger enforcement of antitrust laws, and government controlled agricultural prices.

Bandow points out some of the contradictions and flaws in Berry's critique of the modern market economy. He seems to ignore the benefits generated by capitalism and technology, such as how higher yields and lower costs in agriculture have made it easier to feed the poor. Technology and economic growth often result in a better environment by reducing the amount of cultivated land needed to feed a growing population and reducing pollution and waste from industrial production.

Berry's essay suggests that he has a deficient understanding of how the global economic system works. The program of industrial capitalism, he says, is to make too cheap and sell too high, which requires the market for labor and raw materials to be depressed relative to the market for retail commodities. As Bandow notes, Berry's assertion that competition usually leads to the dominance of one producer in each industry is contrary to the experience of firms in a wide variety of businesses.

One of the costs of our modern economic system, according to Berry, is the loss of the principle of vocation, whereby people choose the work they do because they are called to it. The "total economy" replaces vocation with economic determinism, where people have "no choice but to do the work (if any) that the economy prescribes" (p. 425). What he does not consider is that the modern economy may actually increase the variety of career options from which to choose so that people can specialize in work that is more consistent with their natural abilities. Modern methods of production also free up more time for leisure, during which people may pursue their calling.

One element of Berry's criticism of the corporation deserves serious

consideration. The law treats the corporation as a person, yet the corporation lacks many of the important attributes of persons such as aging, personal descendants (who provide hope for the future), and the ability to experience remorse. His critique falls short, however, in that he does not present a realistic alternative to the corporation in its present form.

Stackhouse and Stratton, by contrast, provide a defense of the corporation. The modern corporation has its roots in the religious institutions of Judaism and Christianity. One of the strengths of the corporation as it has developed in the West is that it includes people from many families and nations. Most "opposition to the corporate economy has faltered, failed, or invited forms of social and political control that have proven worse than what it opposed" (p. 456).

The question of who runs the corporation and whether it is run according to moral principles is important. Stackhouse and Stratton view the movement of business leadership toward professionalism as a step in the right direction. Professions in the classic sense involve "dedication to principles and purposes transcending material gain and recognition" (p. 460).

It is an open question whether professions such as business management "can cultivate an inner sense of meaning in our time" (p. 462). Stackhouse and Stratton note that our view of the corporation does not usually include covenantal patterns of relationship nor do we often discuss a trustee-stewardship model of management. It is important for managers to think about these kinds of things in order to cultivate a society that is morally rich and guided by spiritual principles.

None of the pro-market essayists give adequate consideration to Berry's concern about the implications of viewing the corporation as a person or to related questions about who is responsible for the actions of the corporation. If the goal of the business corporation is construed to be profit-maximization, then what, if any, obligations does it have to employees and their families and to the communities where it is located? Does the fact that there is no person or small group of persons who is ultimately responsible work against covenantal relationships between corporations and their workers? Do corporations have adequate incentives to adhere to a long term plan of resource stewardship that accounts for the wellbeing of local communities and future generations? Perhaps Christians should think more about ways to reform corporations to address these concerns without sacrificing the tremendous economic benefits that have resulted from the corporate organization of production.

Stackhouse and Stratton also discuss the relationship between technology

and the environment. They argue that the dominion mandate combined with the impact of sin implies that humans should reorder nature to the good. While in other religions, science was a means that enabled people to conform more perfectly to the cosmic order, Christianity has led people to use technology to transform the world. Without spiritual roots to provide a regulatory moral guide to the use of technology, it "could become a peril and not a resource for the human future" (p. 453).

Schindler is more critical of the way technology has been used to transform nature. While not denying the importance of active engagement with the natural world, he argues for the importance of seeking to understand and adjust our actions to the cosmic order of things. Modern technology is often developed and applied without consideration of the purpose for which God created man and nature. Thus, for example, the computer influences the way we think about the world, emphasizing acquiring, manipulating, and controlling data in place of such habits as "patient interiority, contemplativeness, of wonder, of sustained mutual presence" (p. 408).

III. Conclusion: the Compatibility of Christianity with a Liberal Economic Order

The theme that repeats itself in the essays by the critics of the market order is the question of purpose. Walker is critical of the market's alleged neutrality with respect to the question of the "objective good of the person." Davis emphasizes Grant's concern with how technology has transformed the way we think by substituting the pursuit of freedom and progress for the pursuit of what is good. The perceptive question we are left with by the critics of the liberal economic order is whether in its emphasis on freedom, that order constrains the ability of the state and other institutions to foster pursuit of what is good in human society.

One of the most common criticisms of the liberal (free-market) economic order is that is it premised upon unbridled individualism. Neuhaus in his essay argues that individualism is one of the signal achievements of modernity. He acknowledges that there is a "problem with the contemporary distortion of the individual as the autonomous, unencumbered, sovereign Self" (p. 296). Individualism and an organic Catholic understanding of community are not opposing ideas, if the idea of the individual is grounded in an understanding of the human person as destined for communion with God. The real-world alternative to individualism is not community, but collectivism.

Crawford, in an essay entitled "The 'Bourgeois Family' and the

Meaning of Freedom and Community," discusses the relationship between individualism and community in a liberal economic order. He notes that liberalism, while seeing community as essential, has a conception of community that arises within an understanding of freedom that remains fundamentally "indifferent" to it. Crawford is critical of "the liberal abstraction of freedom from community and love." Within a liberal framework, familial freedom is only a possible actualization of freedom. The result is that the family tends to mimic the structures of the free market so that the family is viewed as a "voluntaristic" community. He argues instead for a creational sense of freedom and community, where "freedom arises within the relationship with others who engage our capacity for mutual belonging" (p. 169).

The emphasis on each human life as a gift is emphasized by several of the authors chosen by Schindler, but also by Morse in her essay "Making Room at the Inn." Morse's contribution emphasizes how the impersonal welfare state fails to address the fact that dependent people need human relationships and personal care. She also recognizes that the utilitarian view of the needy characteristic of our modern free market economy also results in a failure to love them and provide the personal care that they need. Morse argues that while those who are dependent have legal rights, they also have cultural rights, which impose obligations on their relatives and neighbors.

In responding to Morse's essay, Schindler argues that while she implies that the economic system can be separated from a utilitarian culture, she presupposes the very logic of utilitarianism as the basis for her praise of capitalism. He questions whether her vision of humanizing the free society is feasible if the economic culture continues to be based on the primacy of "instrumentalized self-interest." Capitalism is both an economic and cultural system, and thus cannot be separated from the utilitarian anthropology on which it is based without being radically transformed.

The essays by Schindler and some of the other authors that he chose are helpful in pointing out that capitalism in its present form has some major flaws. It is connected to the liberal social order derived from the enlightenment, an order which emphasizes individual autonomy and economic growth based on self interest. There is plenty of room for reformation of this liberal social order, even at the most fundamental level. A greater economic role for the state, particularly one that emphasizes redistributing income or regulating market transactions, is not the answer to the problems of capitalism. Hill, Bandow, and other defenders of

a market system do an excellent job of pointing out the advantages of free markets and the problems with coercive intervention by the state. As Bandow points out, there is no reason to expect that becoming less free would make us more virtuous.

The critics of capitalism fail to make a convincing case for direct regulation of economy activity or government redistribution. Perhaps the state can play a different role that takes account of some of the fundamental concerns raised by Schindler and the authors he selected. There may be things that the state can do to counterbalance the emphasis on self interest and personal autonomy of the liberal order. Other institutions may also be able to play a role in this. The ideas expressed by the critics of capitalism would be more credible if they spent more time discussing creative ways to transform capitalism that do not include substituting socialism or greater state mandated income redistribution.

Poverty, Government, and the Meaning of Economics

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What we have here are two books within a single pair of covers. The essayists chosen by Bandow (for the purposes of this discussion I am treating only contributions of Hill, Novak, Morse, and Griswold, along with Bandow's own) are called "liberals" in this book, as in classical liberals who believe in free markets and limited government. This terminology is very misleading for the average reader. In common American political terms, they are "conservatives," and that is what I will call them. They all are directing their writing here at making a case that government should not be involved in policies aimed at reducing income inequality, either within the United States or abroad.

The essayists chosen by Schindler (here I will consider Long, Cavanaugh, and Crawford, along with Schindler's contribution) are called "socialists." This terminology is confusing, because they are not socialists in the sense that economists normally use the term, and they mostly seem to believe in a position that in common American political terminology would be called "liberal." I will call them "Schindler's liberals." Their essays are directed at making a case that a modern democratic capitalist economic system is not neutral with respect to the moral values and goals of agents, but biases their choices in ways that privilege the pursuit of wealth over other human values that are more important to Christians.

I. Poverty and Government

The conservatives' argument about government and distribution is based on some very audacious claims that are not documented, and on arguments that are not carefully thought through. Schindler's liberals do not dispute any of these propositions, since their papers address different issues entirely. I will begin by reviewing three important premises of the conservatives' argument, and discuss some of their internal problems. Then I will challenge all three of these propositions. In a later section, I will deal with the issues that Schindler's liberals bring up.

The basic argument of the conservatives goes like this:

1. Poverty in the sense that Christians mean it must be defined in absolute terms. The mere existence of a certain level of inequality in a society does not necessarily mean that anyone in that society is actually poor (Hill, p. 2; Novak, pp. 62, 74; Bandow, pp. 317, 320). A thousand years ago, pretty nearly everybody was poor (Griswold, p. 231). The implication is that in industrialized societies today, nearly nobody is poor (Griswold, p. 223). A situation of inequality is preferred to perfect equality if the incomes of the least well off are higher in the unequal situation (Hill, pp. 3–4; Griswold, p. 231). Complaints about inequality are based merely on envy, which Christians should not endorse (Bandow, p. 319; Hill, p. 4).

2. There is a distinction between the poor who deserve help and the poor who do not deserve help (Morse, p. 193). Children, the elderly, and people who are sick or disabled deserve help (Novak, p. 70; Morse, pp. 180–1). People who do not work hard or who make poor life choices do not deserve help (Bandow, p. 321). Among the undeserving poor are mothers of children, single or married, who should be supported by the children's fathers, so that the mothers can stay at home and care for the children (Novak, p. 71; Morse, p. 194).

None of the writers in this book discusses the working poor, so it is unclear whether the conservatives consider them deserving or not. This is a problem, because one of the big changes in the political atmosphere in the United States over the last 25 years is a change in attitude toward the working poor. In the early 1980s, most people did not consider them deserving, and the Reagan-era welfare reforms were designed to exclude them from the "safety net." This was based on Charles Murray's argument in *Losing Ground* (1984) that the working poor would never accept help and would not need it. Over the next two decades this argument was discredited, and the Clinton-era reforms were based on the idea that people who "work hard and play by the rules" deserve help.

To hold that the working poor are undeserving, the conservatives would have to maintain that market wages and prices always reward hard work and good intentions. Hill points to evidence from controlled experiments that differences in work effort can account for as much as a ten-fold difference in earnings (pp. 4–5). He seems to draw the conclusion that many market-based earnings differences are the result of differences in work effort (pp. 5–6), which would mean the working poor do not work hard enough. Hill (p. 10) and Bandow (p. 319) both claim that some poverty is due to failure of government to protect individual rights, especially property rights. The victims of these failures might be deserving, even if they work. They do not give any examples, so it is hard to know exactly what they have in mind. Hill has no problem with family inheritance playing a large role in determining the distribution of opportunity and wealth (p. 10), which is inconsistent with the idea that the market distribution should only reward individual merit.

There is some daylight between Bandow and the others on this issue. Bandow understands that earnings differences have to do with the marketability of people's output more than with effort, and he is fine with that. Let Michael Jordan and Barbra Streisand earn their millions (p. 321). (One wonders what he thinks of truly bad singers who earn millions.) Bandow takes the libertarian position associated with Robert Nozick that such differences are just, simply because they are the outcome of uncoerced exchanges (p. 333). But libertarians believe that no poor people should get help, and that's a position that Christians surely cannot endorse, and none of the writers here do. If uncoerced exchanges still leave some people poor, the deserving among them should be helped, but is work enough to make one deserving? Bandow doesn't say. Bandow also takes an ambivalent position about unions. He holds they are necessary to protect the rights of the poor (pp. 323, 334), but thinks they drive up prices unjustly (p. 315).

Another interesting aspect of Bandow's article is that he keeps arguing against positions taken by John Cort and Andrew Kirk, and disapprovingly quotes their writings (pp. 310, 317, 324). But neither is a contributor to this volume, and there is no documentation of the quotations. In fact, there is no documentation of anything in Bandow's piece.

3. Helping the poor is properly the job of churches and other organizations of the moral-cultural sector, and must never be undertaken by government. Government is too remote and bureaucratic to make proper judgments about who is deserving and who is not (Hill, pp. 8–9; Morse, pp. 188, 207). More importantly, when government becomes

involved in taxes and transfers for the purpose of redistributing income, it inevitably becomes oppressive. Redistributing income leads to the kind of oppression symbolized by Hitler's Holocaust, the massacre of the kulaks by Stalin, or the killing fields of Pol Pot (Hill, p. 7; Novak, p. 58; Bandow, pp. 322–323). Moderate welfare states have all failed, suffering from "bloated public budgets, imploding public pension systems, bulging jail populations, counterproductive work incentives, and hobbled national economies. Individuals, families and communities were destroyed by authoritarian paternalism, with a panoply of disastrous social pathologies ensuing" (Bandow, pp. 307–308. He does allow for a "safety net," however: p. 317).

On the other hand, market-oriented reforms in mainland China have placed that country on the way to democratic capitalism, a path pioneered by Taiwan and South Korea (Bandow, p. 323; Griswold, pp. 233–234). These writers never criticize dictators who favor the church or make market-oriented reforms, no matter how many of their opponents they murder. One thinks of Franco and Pinochet.

Since I believe that all three of these premises are wrong, I will devote the major part of my essay to challenging them.

1. Poverty is always defined in the context of a particular society. The best definition I know of poverty is "the lack of opportunity to fulfill God's callings." Such opportunity involves access to the goods and services necessary to maintain a dignified life in society, opportunity to develop and use one's labor and other resources to provide as much as possible for oneself, and opportunity to make one's own economic decisions (Tiemstra *et al.* 1990, pp, 234–235).

Consider Griswold's thought experiment. He claims a society where everyone makes $1000 is less good than a society where half the people make $2000 and half make $20,000. In the latter, he claims, the poor have more access to necessary goods than in the former. But this is unlikely to be true. In the former society, everybody rides the bus. In the latter society, many people have private cars, and there are no busses. The fraction of the poor who can't afford a car are in trouble, especially if there are not enough of them to generate demand for jitneys or combis. They are cut off from health care, educational opportunities, church, competitive shopping, and worst of all, jobs. They need help, but of course they are not deserving. In many communities in the United States today, you cannot escape poverty if you do not own or cannot drive a car (Fletcher *et al.* 2002). A similar problem occurs in the housing market. Unequal incomes drive up the relative price of housing, meaning that the lower end of the market gets

housing that has "filtered down," and consequently is subdivided into very small units and is in dilapidated condition.

We know quite a bit from comparative international data about the effect that income inequality and relative poverty have on social problems such as crime, education, pollution, and health. Relative poverty drives up the cost to government and moral-cultural institutions of dealing with such social problems, and is a drag on economic growth (Tiemstra 1992). The idea that greater inequality will cause the least well off to benefit from economic growth is contradicted by the data. We know that because of increased inequality in the United States over the last 30 years, the average worker has not benefited from economic growth. The median real wage for non-supervisory workers is still well below its 1972 peak.

If everybody was poor in ancient times, why does the Bible go on so much about poverty? Why does the Bible insist that some people give money to other people "so that there may be equality," if all of them are poor? (2 Cor. 8:13) The Bible never offers an absolute definition of poverty, nor for that matter a firm definition of a just wage or price. The biblical record on the poverty issue makes sense only if poverty is a relative social phenomenon. All of the objections that Bandow offers to the "just wage" concept (p. 340) apply equally to the "absolute poverty" concept.

The idea that any complaint about inequality must be based on envy is simply a case of attributing the worst possible motives to those with whom you disagree, without having any grounds for doing so. This is not an ethical way to make an argument. It is as if I were to claim that the conservatives' position is motivated only by their greed, and consequent unwillingness to part with their own money to help others. I am sure the conservatives would be offended by that.

2. Followers of God have an obligation to help all poor people without passing judgment on whether or not they are deserving. A society that meets the biblical standards of justice will offer support to all of the poor regardless of their circumstances. This means that we will help some people who are lazy or opportunistic, but it is up to God to judge them, not us. Jesus always made clear that he helped people because of their need, and sometimes their faith, not their works. The type of help that is offered should be designed to be the most effective based on the causes of the poverty at hand.

Morse almost gets this right in her discussion of "the law of the gift" (pp. 201–205). In fact she is following Calvin and the church fathers before him in acknowledging that all of our access to wealth and material resources comes to us as a gracious gift from God, and not because of

our own merit. We are merely stewards, not owners, of these resources. What Morse does not do is follow Calvin in reaching the only logical conclusion: we have no more right to the money in our pocket than the beggar on the street does. In fact, if we have two coats and he has none, he has more right to our second coat than we do (Luke 6:29). I have written on this at greater length elsewhere (Tiemstra 2002).

The idea that some limit on economic inequality is a desirable feature of a society does not stem from some idea that everyone is equally virtuous or hard working. It is based on the idea that all people bear the image of God, and that all people are loved by God. Therefore the people of God have an obligation to love all people equally and provide for them to live a life in which they can respond to God's callings to them. An excellent introduction to this line of thought is Wolterstorff (1983, ch. 4). A more modern and thorough account is Hicks (2000).

Morse offers a story from her own life as an example of what families should do to support their own (pp. 208–212). She has taken into her home and cared for a Romanian orphan boy as well as her desperately ill mother-in-law. This necessitated postponing completion of her book, and fitting her publicity tour around doctors' appointments and the availability of respite care. Her only regret is that she relied too heavily on hired help. Morse's generosity and care are admirable, but since she is so immodest as to propose this as a model, let me point out the obvious. Morse's work is very remunerative, and she has an extraordinary degree of control over her own time. The choices that she has are not available to the overwhelming majority of American families. To suggest that her experience is applicable to people of average means is out of touch with reality.

A great deal of the poverty in this country results because the jobs that are available to many folks do not pay very well, even though they require very hard work. Anyone who doubts this should read works like Barbara Ehrenreich's *Nickel and Dimed* (2001). Then compare the work effort of a front-line worker in a house-cleaning service with the workload of a corporate CEO, who is paid hundreds (not tens) of times more, and whose 60-hour "work" week includes dinner parties and golf outings. The market does not always and only reward hard work or virtue, and there is no reason to think that the distribution of market incomes has any important moral properties. The major social institutions need to do something about this. Businesses have an obligation to pay their workers fairly. Scripture is very clear about this (e.g. James 5), and so is the tradition of Christian social thought. There is no mention of the responsibilities of business to treat their workers well in this book. At the bottom of this is a faulty theory of

markets, but more about that later.

3. Government is empowered to establish justice in society. Justice includes proper care for the poor and, if possible, the eradication of poverty. Government should make use of the infrastructure of the moral-cultural sector of society to accomplish these ends, but the charitable sector does not have the resources on its own to address the poverty problem adequately.

It is not clear why the volunteer deacons at First Presbyterian Church would do a better job determining who needs help than the professional social workers down the street at the county welfare office. In a lot of cases, they are the same people anyway. Though Morse dismisses this concern (p. 188), churches can be inappropriately judgmental in their attitudes toward the poor.

The problem with Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia was not that the tax rates were too high. In the end, taxes and transfer payments are only money. In the larger scheme of things it is just not that important. The comparisons made by these conservative writers between democratic welfare states and oppressive dictatorships are bizarre. When it comes to oppression, I am much less worried about high taxes than I am about an American President who seems to think he has the legal authority to incarcerate and torture anyone he wants without charges and without trial.

Access to the legal system and to the political arena in the United States requires substantial resources, which is why the poor often do not have adequate access, and the political system in our country represents the interests of the rich and powerful much better than those of the poor (Phillips 2002). The biblical concern about oppression of the poor is less about legal injustice causing income poverty than about the tendency of the system to neglect the interests of those whose lack of wealth leaves them legally powerless. Bandow worries that government action will violate the commandment against theft (p. 316), but the main worry of the reformers and the church fathers was about rich people stealing from the poor. The Heidelberg Catechism, question 110, about the eighth commandment, stresses inaccurate weights and measures, fraudulent merchandising, and excessive interest. That concern reflects the priorities of the Bible as well, as in passages like Leviticus 19, which talks about employers holding back wages, or Proverbs 16, which talks about just weights and measures in commerce.

Bandow's claim that the moderate welfare states have all failed does not stand up to the facts. The welfare states of Western Europe have lower

rates of crime and incarceration than the United States. They perform better on almost every measure of educational achievement and health than we do. They have fewer teenage pregnancies and fewer abortions. The U.S. budget deficit is a bigger proportion of GDP than that of any of the euro-zone countries. The United Nations Human Development Index places the United States fourth in the world, behind Norway, Sweden, and Canada, and tied with Belgium and Australia (UNDP 2003, p. 149). We only rank that high because we are ahead of the others in per capita GDP.

II. The Meaning of Economics

Schindler's liberals devote their space in this volume to exploring the meaning of economic activity in market economies. However much business managers may want to behave in a way that reflects Christian values, the inner logic of capitalism and the environment of competition make it impossible for them to focus on anything other than economic efficiency, profitability, and the maximization of shareholder wealth. These powerful institutions, and the wealthy and powerful people who control them, transmit these values to the employees in the workplace, who have to pursue the organization's objectives in their jobs. We all then carry these values with us into our private lives, which tend to be more and more governed by a concern with wealth and economic status. These values are reinforced by the media, which are controlled by wealthy corporations, directly through ownership and indirectly through advertising, and reflect these corporate values.

The claim that these liberal writers are making is that this distortion of human values and motivations is intrinsic to the nature of capitalism. It is clear that their understanding of capitalism has been influenced by the defenses of it that are offered by the conservatives. Both sets of writers seem to accept a theory of capitalism that is based on a version of Austrian School economics, in which innovation and change drive growth, and economic development and growth are of primary importance. They believe that in a modern market economy, competitive pressures become very intense. This is especially true in the age of globalization, when markets are no longer confined to national boundaries, but the competitive process spans continents. As we all learned in introductory economics, businesses have no choice under these circumstances but to maximize profits. Any other choice leads to bankruptcy.

The conservative writers want to claim that the freedom offered by a market economy enables people to live by whatever values they choose, hopefully Christian ones. Novak says, "Empirical research seems to

confirm the primacy of spirit, and to disconfirm merely materialistic accounts of human behavior" (p. 54). He also stresses the "subjectivity of society," the ability of people to act, rather than merely behave (pp. 56–57). Novak even claims that "materialism" is on the wane, because people are buying more services rather than material goods (p. 53). Of course, this has nothing do with the larger point about the preoccupation with wealth. Griswold claims that multinational corporations bring high environmental and labor standards with them when they invest in less-developed countries, and that as incomes grow, these countries adopt these higher standards as their own (presumably by government regulation) (p. 225). Bandow concludes, "Liberal economics merely allows people to think of themselves in a certain way; it does not make them do so, nor would making the economy illiberal cause them to cease doing so" (p. 327). Bandow even claims, astonishingly, that "the market rewards honesty and trustworthiness" (p. 328). His example is the failure of the Arthur Anderson accounting firm. He does not seem to understand that this came about because of SEC regulation and enforcement of the securities laws, i.e., government action, not the market. But when it really matters, economic development and growth trump all other values for the conservatives, so they contend that there really are no choices. Griswold fears that including provisions for higher labor and environmental standards in trade agreements will become a drag on economic growth (p. 237), and he approves of the pressure on governments to create a "more friendly business climate" for foreign investors and local entrepreneurs alike (p. 219). Bandow disparages "above-market wages" as "charity carried out under the guise of business" (p. 339). He also believes that "Private monopolies usually break down quickly due to competition" (p. 331). If the competitive process is so intense that there are really no choices, then Schindler's liberals are right, and Christian values have no place in a market economy.

My own view is that this account of how the market economy works is not useful, precisely because it places too much stress on the process of competition and the inevitability of market equilibrium outcomes (Tiemstra 1993, 1994). That is not the way the world really is, and its a good thing too. Businesses and individuals do have choices to the degree that they enjoy market power, and market power is more pervasive than generally thought. Globalization tends to privilege the power of businesses over the other sectors of society, and the values of economic growth over other values, but there are ways to correct that. So Schindler's liberals are wrong that materialism and preoccupation with wealth are intrinsic to the nature

of market economies. Freedom and choice are possible, and we can live as Christians in a capitalist world. Christians should be entering the business professions, in order to spread their influence, and counter materialistic values.

By failing to address the social responsibilities of business in this work, the conservatives leave the liberals' argument unanswered, and pass up the opportunity to address the deeper causes of poverty and injustice. Society has the right to expect businesses to conform to the moral norms that God requires for justice. When businesses do not live up to these responsibilities, it is no surprise that people turn to government to address problems like poverty, sustainability, and civil rights.

III. Conclusion

This book is disappointing, because it should have been better than it is. The authors represented here are distinguished scholars with long records of productive contributions to Christian social thought. But this book is inadequately researched, sloppily thought through, and carelessly edited. Instead, I recommend reading Gushee (1999) or Carlson-Thies and Skillen (1996).

More importantly, this book will confirm for many people all of their worst stereotypes of the evangelical community. Schindler's liberals seem to be only interested in airy abstractions far removed from anything practical. The conservatives come off as arrogant, self-righteous, and above all judgmental. These are the things that drive people away from the church and away from God. Our Lord Jesus was none of these things. When a common prostitute came to wash his feet, his disciples expected him to send her away. She was not deserving of their help. Jesus did not turn her away, but forgave her (Luke 7:36–50). If we want people to accept Jesus' message and join the Christian church, we need to bring our thinking and our doing closer to his model.

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Wealth, Poverty, and Human Destiny: A Selective Review

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My aim in this essay is to review those parts of this theologically-rooted collection that consider "whether and to what extent the global [my specific charge in what follows] market economy helps the poor" (vii).

Two things attracted me to this task. One was the emphasis on globalization, income distribution, and poverty, which has been an area of special attention for me for a quarter-century. The other was the hope

that theology (in which I am not well-schooled) would be woven into the discourse.

I come away only modestly fulfilled.

I will explain why, and organize my essay, by answering four questions.

- What will typical economists learn from this collection?
- What might thoughtful Christians and other readers learn from it?
- What do I wish I might have read, but didn't find?
- What would I myself have written if asked to write by the editors?

Long sets as his task in Chapter 4 to assess two specific corporations theologically. He is careful to define the nature and boundaries of a "theological assessment," and he very succinctly synthesizes the theological assessments of corporate institutions developed by Gustavo Gutierrez, John Milbank, Alisdair MacIntyre, Stackhouse (with Dennis McCann), and Novak. This synthesis is a great service; it is an authoritative and eclectic group.

But Long's essay is mis-titled. "Catholic Social Teaching and the Global Market" is a far less accurate title than "Catholic Social Teaching and Two Companies." Though both companies engage in global transactions, this fact is completely incidental.

So my first lamentation is that Long didn't really write about how globalization changes the discourse. But my deeper disappointment was that so thoughtful a scholar would choose so modest a mandate for himself. Two firms only? One from the 1980s? With no claims to representativeness—Long calls one a "difficult case" and the other "so unjust that it is a rather easy case"(p. 80)? With explicit abjuring of any "neutral social analysis of 'reality'" (p. 82) as a prelude to theological assessment?[1] What does an assessment of these two corporations teach us about anything? Long never tells us. What a shame.

What might typical economists learn from Long's essay? The same thing as other reflective readers. Here is a thoughtfully contentious discussion of economics and millennial theology (Roman Catholic Social Teaching) that goes far beyond mere musing on usury and just wages. This is worth absorbing deeply. And, here, incidentally, is a provocative argument that Adam Smith's underlying theology was basically Stoic (so "Christians beware" of Smith)!

Griswold is a coherent compiler and clear writer, as befits those who find their scholarly home in North American think tanks. His Chapter 9 brief in favor of globalization[2] is as good as it gets. It confronts directly

the most prominent arguments advanced by globalization's critics, that it impoverishes, enslaves, and marginalizes large numbers of the world's people, and allows corporations to sink toward the lowest global level of regulation (the "race to the bottom").

Yet the closest Griswold comes to theology is the pragmatic instrumentalism of good consequences. And he disregards both the central (though not global) questions in Long's essay—the comparative economic justice of alternative forms of corporate structure (family-owned firms vs. publically-owned vs. many variations that Long does not mention)—and the concomitant issue of social regulation of action, responsibility, and ownership. Griswold is quite capable of tackling this Long-inspired agenda. But he did not.

What a shame that the editors made no effort at (or had no success) inducing their authors to scholarly reflection *with each other*, on *common issues*.

More serious and surprising, even granted Griswold's ethics of consequence, is his neglect of the "bads" (as well as the goods) that globalization facilitates: human trafficking, corruption (selling social trust and public goods for private gain), and trade in weaponry, terrorist techniques, and addictive substances and practices (gambling, pornography, tax evasion).

Griswold mentions, but does not adequately emphasize two typical "fellow travelers" of increased globalization. One is internal institutional reform, the other is internal diffusion of globalization's gains. Reform means creating social institutions that are widely accepted as effective and legitimate. Diffusion means spreading material gains reasonably widely across a large majority of a society's population. Griswold's reading of history is that these two concomitants naturally follow a society's commitment to global openness—just as symbiotic organisms follow their hosts. Other scholars, not represented well in Griswold's references, see openness, equity, and legitimate institutions as three equal marriage partners, and read history to say that any one of the three can "lead" development, but that all three are equally necessary and all three must be consciously cultivated by collective action.[3]

I think theologians are far more attracted to the latter view, and to working with economists and other social scientists when issues are approached organically, and with less of the *primus-inter-pares* position that Griswold and most economists give to economic openness.

So what can economists learn from Griswold's chapter? Certainly how to present a cogent case. But I don't think reflective readers will learn

much that they haven't heard before or elsewhere, despite Griswold's commendable intelligibility.[4] Such readers will likely, once again, sadly reflect that economists simply do not "scratch where the world itches," to say nothing of ministering where the world hurts.

My respectful dissatisfaction with Long's and Griswold's chapters might have been allayed by the editors' own contributions to the collection. But it wasn't.

I regret to observe that Bandow's 38-page, un-annotated review essay provides little intellectual *engagement* with Schindler's 65-page counterpart, nor Schindler's with Bandow's. Each reviews the essays of selected contributors, favoring some and opposing others—predictably. Neither devotes more than a page to the special challenges that *global* markets, media, and mobility pose to traditional Christian social ethics. Taken together, the editors' review essays (especially Bandow's) focus nearly exclusively on the familiar, stale, markets-vs.-morality and capitalism-vs.-socialism contentions.

Schindler is, however, commendably comprehensive in addressing the deep differences between the two groups of chapter authors in their background "anthropology"—by which he means how they understand the nature and destiny of man. What he writes stimulated me, especially his concerns about the mixed blessings and perversions of philosophical liberalism and "liberal anthropology," especially when compared to Roman Catholic thought about civilized societies of love and "relational-personal" anthropological identity. But I will suggest below that Schindler might have fruitfully added even more about their implied *political sociology*.

What might I have preferred to what I got? And am I really so hard to please? I don't think so.

I longed for more intellectual engagement…between social scientists and theologians…between scholars and practitioners…the kind of intellectual engagement often embedded in summaries of discussant comments and floor discussions (assuming there was a conference at which authors presented) after each chapter…the kind that comes when editors work hard to distill consensus as well as dissensus.

I longed for more theological engagement…between serious Catholics and serious Protestants…between "Bandow's contributors" and "Schindler's essayists"—what good can it possibly do to divide them this way on pp. viii and 347, except as truth in advertising? They are divided all the way through the volume, even in the peculiar appendices by Berry and Stackhouse/Stratton, allegedly included for additional background,

but coming across to me as disjointed afterthoughts.

Ultimately, I longed for more than "two views." Where were the irenic centrists, scholars like Rebecca Blank or Donald Hay? Where were the activist/public intellectuals like Peter Berger and Ron Sider? Where were Orthodox perspectives, Jewish, Islamic? Where were humanist perspectives—how can the authors of a book like this pay no attention at all to the deep and provocative thinking on the ethics of market institutions by scholars such as Amartya Sen and Anthony Giddens and David Held?[5] Theological reflection should not take place in a theological cocoon.

And what would I have written if I had been asked to contribute? Only social science (I know little else), though I would surely have grown intellectually from engaging a theological co-author as judicious as Long.

I would have begun with what I have called elsewhere[6] the "market *system*," and inferred what my characterization might imply for a "*global* market *system*."

I would have said that the modern market system is generically a complex, vertical, and social network of purchases and sales, contracts and conventions among firms—each of which is internally itself a social unit. The market system is in turn a mix of competition and cooperation among the social units; it is a social organism. The pragmatic quality of the organism's competition and cooperation determines how effectively it combines fundamental inputs such as worker services to produce final goods for those very workers (that is the measure of their standard of living). The ethical legitimacy of the organism's competition and cooperation determines how justly and sustainably it aids material standards of living and whether people are subjectively satisfied with their material outcomes.[7]

Government economic regulations condition this competitive-cooperative market system, internally within a firm and externally across them.[8] Among other goals, such regulations aim to make the market system work pragmatically better and more justly for a broader constituency. Designed properly, they are market-supportive and simultaneously part of the legitimizing social infrastructure.[9] They regulate the intensity of competition, the scope of cooperation, and define the due processes and legal boundaries for both, including the ethically vital boundary between coercive and voluntary transactions.[10]

In sum, the market system is socially populated, socially rooted, socially conditioned, and socially constructed. It is far, far away from the chaotically competitive "law of the jungle" with which it is sometimes

rhetorically confused.

I maintain that, correspondingly, an economically and politically sustainable *global* market *system* will be socially constructed and conditioned, too, by policy design, and will be legitimized only by serious, deep, constructive engagement among social-science scholars, ethicists and theologians, and practitioners of the majority of the world's religions and ideologies, including critics of the current system.

Now *that* enterprise *would* warrant the ennobling words "Human Destiny" that appear in the title to this incomplete collection.

Endnotes

1 He means by this what he says later in more detail: "…no definitive account of the 'real' exists apart from a particular historical language …No 'social fact' exists without its narratability via language" (p. 98). True enough, but Long skates too close for my taste to sacrificing detailed description-qua-deliberation (since it is so fraught) on the altar of theological assessment.

2 He defines it helpfully at the beginning of his essay: liberalization of [cross-border barriers to] international trade, investment, and migration. The emphasis on freer migration as part of globalization is not shared by all globalization enthusiasts, and Griswold provides no detail for his defense.

3 Any recent writings by Dani Rodrik might suffice. An up-to-date summary exists in a symposium on the roles of geography, globalization, and institutions at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/06/index.htm.

4 For example, three recent book-length treatments of globalization in Griswold's *apologia* mold are Bhagwati (2004), Lindsey (2002), and Wolf (2004).

5 Sen (1999) most carefully develops his conception of development and its norms. Giddens (1999) offers his most cogent and provocative treatment of globalization as a shaper and re-shaper of norms toward tradition, family, polity, and risk-avoidance, revised and re-issued in 2002. Held's multidisciplinary and normative contributions are best seen at www.polity.co.uk/global, where many recent variations are displayed of Held *et al*. (1999).

6 See Richardson (2000, 2001).

7 The social-science literature that links subjective perceptions of well-being to objective measures of material prosperity has recently mushroomed. See Graham and Pettinato (2002) for an accessible introduction and implementation. Unless I missed it, none of the

contributors to this collection seem aware of this literature, and how it might be construed to reflect altruism, ambition, envy, greed, and revenge.

8 Firms include corporations, partnerships, "not-for-profits," labor unions, and others. Many of the market's social groups have legal status that grants them the right to collectively own and exchange property, including intangible property (e.g., intellectual property) and licenses (e.g., to represent a set of workers), and to differentiate and isolate their legal liability as group members from their liability as individuals.

9 This "progressive" view of the way government regulation can support markets (or "augment" them, to use Mancur Olson's term) has deep roots in economic history and philosophy, in the institutional school, and in the social gospel. It is unfortunate that the progressive view is often submerged by both shallow, breathless defenses of "free" markets and alarmist, populist accounts of the war between greed and governance. Not all economic regulations are market-supportive. Some are market-prohibiting, others market-inhibiting—though often "for a good cause" (e.g., prohibitions on slavery or on markets in socially dangerous goods and services, or limitations on current markets to avoid extinction of future markets, as in fisheries regulation). Still other regulations are distant from markets, such as so-called social regulation.

10 Specific examples help to clarify: (1) Company law enhances the market for corporate control; it establishes categories of voting rights and procedures for shareholders, and determines when and how a rival firm's managers can compete for the shareholders' allegiance (cooperation). (2) Labor-relations law enhances the market for cooperative representation—agency; it establishes workplace voting procedures for workers to be represented collectively by a union, and when and how another union could compete for certification to organize the workers cooperatively.

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Two Different Worlds, We Live in Two Different Worlds

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The essays in this volume were all written by Christians but they reflect two different worlds. One world is the world of free market capitalism and democratic political institutions. This is the world in which one of the editors, Doug Bandow, lives. He is associated with the Cato Institute and the classical liberal wing of Christian economists and chooses the pro-market writers. The other world (perhaps in more than one sense of that phrase) is that of the editor, David L. Schindler, editor of *Communio*, who chooses the essayists who write largely in opposition to the market. Since we suspect that the pro-market group is more familiar to most of our readers, we will spend more time on the Schindler writers.

This book is very important for the members of the Association of Christian Economists since it reflects disagreements that perennially occur at our meetings and sessions. Although the spectrum of positions is not really quite as wide as the ACE sessions—there are not really any leftists in the bunch—this does not matter. There is a type of Tory socialism which outdoes the Marxists in their hatred of free markets and capitalism. To a certain extent this view characterizes the work of a number of contributors to this volume. But these critics do not share the Marxists' tolerance of capitalism as a necessary stage in the movement to complete modernity by which the Marxists mean the eclipse of God.

This may be the result of the fact that the book is published by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute so perhaps a disclaimer is in order here; one of the authors of this essay is currently on the Board of Trustees of ISI, an organization dedicated to the cause of ordered liberty.

Both poles of order and liberty are well represented in this volume although there are no flat-out libertarians on the pro-market side. Wilhelm Roepke always used to draw the line between extremists of *economism* and *moralism*. There are no defenders of economism, selfishness, and utilitarianism among either group. Both groups would agree with the statement in *Centesimus Annus*, "it is not possible to understand man on the basis of economics alone." In fact it is clarifying to say that they are contending for the soul of Pope John Paul II.

What, then, are the two different worlds and more importantly how are they related? Can one distinguish between the realm of the sacred and the realm of the secular? The Schindler group doesn't want the heart to draw a line. If a motivation is not sacred, it is sinful. The lyrics to the love song, "Two Different Worlds," capture the spirit of the Schindler group:

"Nothing matters if I am yours and you are mine.
Two different worlds, we live in two different worlds
For we've been told that a love like ours
Could never be.
So far apart, they say we're so far apart
And that we haven't the right to change our destiny.
When will they learn,
That a heart doesn't draw a line."

There is no secular world except the state of sin which must be overcome by Christian faith. Everyday economic exchanges must be read theologically which requires looking at intentions and never outcomes. Perhaps Schindler's connection to the "John Paul II Institute for Studies on *Marriage and Family*" (our emphasis) signals the fact that the economy must conform to the categories of personal intention. The natural social institutions of marriage and the family are precisely the places where intention matters.

The contribution by Crawford, "The 'Bourgeois Family' and the Meaning of Freedom and Community" makes this very explicit. Community and love trump voluntarism of any sort. Both Novak and Morse stress the importance of the family as independent social units not based on calculation and selfishness. But for Crawford the voluntaristic strain of liberalism will inevitably corrupt the family. Even the virtues of

hard work, diligence, and frugality (the Protestant ethic?) which families encourage are oriented toward the market.

The modern world and the modern economy which require a widespread division of labor and impersonal relations cannot be allowed to stand. There are no possible corrections from independent spheres of culture and politics. We are reminded of the hostility of the Southern Agrarian writers of *I'll Take My Stand* to industrial capitalism. The contribution by Wendell Berry, the writer and poet closest to the Agrarians, signals this connection. Unfortunately, his attempt at positive economics—the closest one comes to real economics by the Schindler group—is the most embarrassing. Critics of cultural malaise are usually better poets than economists.

The demand for a unitary approach is also at the base of Lewis' defense of Aristotle. Aristotle resisted "the characteristically modern attempt to compartmentalize life into different spheres" (p. 242). For Aristotle, the promotion of living well or flourishing is the end of the best regime. Modern liberal regimes, on the other hand, take the purposes of the state to be "the establishment of internal peace and defense against external enemies" (p. 247).

Lewis would be correct if the United States, for example, was simply a Hobbesian-Lockean construct. But that overlooks the living reality of American colonial experience, Federalism, and recent history. Frankly, it is the kind of lived reality of American experience that has motivated people like Novak to be favorably disposed toward American realities. However fuzzy the different spheres can be at times, they are closer to the reality than any theoretical unitary scheme supposedly derived from liberalism.

At the very end of his essay, Lewis does attempt to draw the connections between Aristotle and American agrarianism from Jefferson, the Vanderbilt Agrarians and the contemporaries Berry and Victor Davis Hanson. He also is partial to the English Distributism of G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. We will look forward to Lewis transforming his "suggestions" into a "framework that could generate useful research and suggestions for just what we can realistically do to build the kind of economic and political life that promotes human flourishing" (p. 269).

Long takes the arguments one step further by declaring that free market economics is really a version of heresy. Drawing on the work of theologian John Milbank, we must be socialists because capitalism derives from the "fideist-nominalist-voluntarist current in theology" of the middle ages, transmitted to Hobbes and Grotius, and is the basis for "possessive individualism." Presumably in agreement Long describes

Milbank's position: "the Christian opposition to capitalism arises solely for theological reasons. The gift God exchanges with creation through Christ must be the basis of all exchanges. Christianity opposes capitalism because the gift can never be reduced to a contract with nicely calculated profit/loss ratios where individuals enter into exchanges without being fundamentally changed by those exchanges" (p. 87). There is a similarity between Long's long-term decline and Richard Weaver's emphasis on nominalism in *Ideas Have Consequences*, another product of the Agrarian critique of modern society. Long might also be surprised (and worried) about the similarity of his view to that of George Gilder in *Wealth and Poverty* where he emphasizes gifts and altruism.

Long also argues that Novak claims "the corporation to be an 'incarnation' of God's presence." Although Long does not wish the corporation to be sanctified or confused with the body of Christ, "it gains its intelligibility within the life of the Church, especially the Church's liturgical performance" (p. 88). A Benedictine monk couldn't say it better.

Long begins his contribution with a tale of two corporations: a comparison between a lobster and shrimp plant off the coast of Honduras and a water meter plant in a small Midwestern town. The injustice of the first is supposed to be self-evident while he is more ambiguous about the second.

There is no question that one would prefer to be an employee of the water meter plant rather than the Honduran lobster and shrimp plant. The conditions of low wages and unremitting hard labor in the underdeveloped part of the world might lead the normal economist to praise the widespread division of labor and wealth of the first world countries. Or, one might be tempted to say, as he sort of does, but not very explicitly, that the wealth of the first world is extracted from the misery of the third world.

What he does not provide is any convincing reason why the Honduran situation is thought to be unjust rather than unfortunate. We agree with Bandow who analyzes Long's contentions later in the book.

Long's "reading" of capitalist exchanges is distorted by his use of a straw man constructed from a tendentious "reading" of Adam Smith. After a long quote from Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* where Smith recalls the ancient stoic view that the "vices and follies of men are as necessary a part of God's providence as their wisdom and virtue," Long states that the economic rationalization of unjust payment of the Honduran workers is simply an acceptance of Smith's stoic theology. With no hope that a just social order will be found in a capitalist system, Long concludes: "If socialism holds forth the possibility that workers can share ownership in

their labor in a non-competitive system in which the interests of owners, shareholders, and workers need not…be pitted against each other, then yes, Christianity must continue to hold forth the possibility of socialism and work for the abolition of capitalism" (p. 101).

Long fails to provide the passage from the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* which immediately follows the one he cites. Smith concludes, "No speculation of this kind, however, how deeply soever it might be rooted in the mind, could diminish our natural abhorrence for vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, and whose remote ones are too distant to be traced by the imagination." The question is not whether the Smithian "system" might contain some elements that would be improved by subordinating them to more specifically Christian ideals. It is, instead, whether the *objective* well-being of the Hondurans is more likely to be advanced through the social order for which Long "holds forth" or through one which falls at least roughly within the bounds of the classical liberal position.

There is a curious air of abstract unreality in most of the Schindler group which may derive from the fact that they are theologians rather than economists. Although Long does not flesh out the meaning of his claim historically, we think it is possible to link it up to Gregg's description of the Middle Ages where the market place is embedded with church and cathedral in the not-so-naked public square. Gregg talks about the merchants and philanthropy, the guild chapels, the market religious festivals, and the patron saints. The church schools taught literacy, accounting, and legal practice which were all necessary for flourishing markets.

But Gregg also recognizes the wild itinerant Franciscan preachers who railed against all forms of commerce and modernity. In Florence in the medieval-Renaissance period the bitter battles between the "observant" and the "conventual" wings of the Franciscans and Dominicans mirror the conflicts between the *communio* group and the Bandow group. The observants demanded a return to absolute poverty, both individually and the total order. The conventuals made their peace with the wealth of the total group even though they still maintained vows of poverty for the individual friar.

There is an irony in all this because the Christian free market defenders have made much of the economic thinking of St. Bernardino of Siena (Franciscan) and St. Antonino of Florence (Dominican) who were Observants and not Conventuals. The reinterpretation of the Scholastic catholic tradition begun by Raymond de Roover, Joseph Schumpeter,

Murray Rothbard, and Alex Chafuen puts a great deal of emphasis on the teaching of these two sensible Saints.

But both these two strict ascetics, St. Bernardino and St. Antonino, understood quite clearly that poverty had to be a voluntary calling and, even then, could be a source of pride. Furthermore, they were opposed to the Spiritual Franciscans, or Fraticelli, who demanded absolute poverty and had an apocalyptic criticism of all worldly activity since the millennium was soon to be on its way. The counterpart to the Spiritual Franciscans in the Dominican order was Savonarola. He was the culmination of the tradition which redefines wealth in terms of spiritual ends alone and links it to the immanent coming of the Kingdom of God on earth.

A radical judgment against the present world as a corrupt, self-interested, corporation driven, and defective individualism/liberalism comes issuing forth from those who believe in the "New Heaven and the New Earth" that is coming or is already here. Schindler tells us that any comparison between systems has to be "compared to the human destiny that Christian faith and indeed the nature of reality itself calls us to embody here and now and on earth, however much that call will be fully realized only eschatologically" (p. 400).

We have a great deal of sympathy with Walker's attack on the implicit ideologies of liberalism. He wants to get at the welfare economics (ideology) often underlying the defense of the free market. The ideologies of voluntarism and subjectivism enshrined in Pareto-optimality or libertarianism (although he does not attack these groups by name) do need to be seriously questioned when they attempt to become the basis for all social philosophy.

It is true that many defenders of the market such as Novak do play a trump card of a "moral discipline from the outside." Perhaps the reviewers are guilty of the same charge in their attempt to distinguish "police powers" and substantive due process in the understanding of American constitutional law.

But there is something to be said for the attempt to capture the lived-reality of societies in all their complexities rather than reduce them to an absolutely logical clarity. The stark contrast between the classical liberal understanding of free economic exchange ("contract among self-interested strangers") and Walker's ("gift-giving among neighbors") (p. 23) oversimplifies the classical liberal understanding with the loaded-term *strangers* and introduces untold complexities of implementing or giving content to exchange understood as gift-giving among *neighbors*

(equally loaded if one takes seriously the parable of the Good Samaritan).

We suggest that it would be more productive to take a different approach: one which rejects the "anthropology of *homo economicus*" (an anthropology which we suspect is rejected by all of the contributors to this volume) and accepts Neuhaus' call to distinguish between "liberalism" and the "liberal tradition." After all, Walker's understanding of the objective good for the human person understood as the enjoyment of ontological wealth—"a restful enjoyment [that] is not opposed to productivity, but distinguishes truly fruitful productivity from the frenetic activity of a culture obsessed with quantifiable results" (p. 33)—is not a concept that is entirely foreign to classical liberalism.

A number of the Founding Fathers whose understanding of political economy was heavily influenced by Adam Smith held a similar view. Indeed, the intellectual pedigree of the Southern Agrarians with whom Berry holds so much in common includes men who did not find Adam Smith quite so repugnant. Certainly there is more to be gained through this approach than through one which begins by declaring—as Schindler does, wrongly in our opinion—that "the 'Smithian' desire for profit be recognized always and everywhere as a vice indicating a need for conversion, however much it is also simultaneously recognized that this vice will never, in the present condition of the world, be entirely removed from the heart of man" (p. 367).

If true freedom and voluntary exchange have to include the "objective good" for all parties, then one needs to know the social institutions and structures of coercion necessary to bring this all about. Walker wants to avoid the coercion of a communist system, but just how can you do that if he means what he says? If intentions are to be left for the confessional, the internal forum, then all is well and good. But we still need to relate the economy to the social and moral order.

If the free market has no *telos*, as Cavanaugh points out, then the alternative social arrangements must have a *telos* in terms of which choices, exchanges, and everyday life is organized. He is right to point out that often human beings pursue the lower things on the chain of being, a point made poetically by George Herbert's "The Pulley."[1]

Cavanaugh would not allow men the chance to become rich and weary; they will be compelled by objective goodness to their supernatural ends. He agrees that state intervention "to impose such a direction on economic activity" would be counterproductive (pp. 127–128), but he has no substantive suggestions other than the Mondragon co-operative as an example of distributist principles.

We are very sympathetic with his attempt to emphasize gift and gratitude as the hallmarks of a Christian understanding of the human condition. Having long worked on developing a political economy of gratitude, albeit unsuccessfully, we are thankful for someone who attempts to flesh out these valuable insights.

Perhaps the most important effort to do something about gifts and gratitude is supplied by some one on the Bandow side of the aisle: Morse's extremely moving article, "Making Room in the Inn: Why the Modern World Needs the Needy." She argues and demonstrates from her own personal experience that "an uplifting vision of free and equal adults making trades among themselves…is not the whole story about the human condition" (p. 181).

The difference between her approach and Schindler's is that she allows an economic system built on economic freedom, and a political system built on democratic principles, to be an important part of the story. She does not throw out the baby with the bath water, but makes appropriate room for the baby, bath water and all.

In her section on redefining the needy as autonomous, she mentions Dr. Spock as one who told us that "good manners come naturally" to infants. Quoting Kay Hymowitz's book *Ready or Not*: "this confirms what the alert reader has begun to suspect, namely, that the world's premier pediatrician, a man whose name is synonymous with childbearing wisdom and experience, *never, ever spent a day with a child"* (p. 496).

Let us conclude with another version of the song, "We Live in Two Different Worlds." This time the song was written by Hank Williams and is not so optimistic about closing the gap between the Kingdom of Man and the Kingdom of God. According to Williams' lyrics:

"We live in two different worlds, dear
That's why we're so far apart
You made your world out of vows that are broken
I built a world in my heart
Everyone here tried to warn me
You were just playing a game
I told them all we were meant for each other
I thought our worlds were the same
If you stay over in your world
Oh, how my poor heart will pine
Darling, someday when your memories wander
Won't you come over in mine
We live in two different worlds, dear

My world is honest and true
Sweetheart, remember when your world gets lonesome
I'll still be waiting for you."

In essence, Hank is Jesus Christ waiting for the beloved to come home but he can't force the sinner who breaks vows and plays games to come back against his will. The problem of humanity is humanity, human sin, and one wonders—and one should wonder—how much social institutions can do to change human intentions. But we should also remember what the road to hell is paved with.

Endnote

1. It reads:

   "WHEN God at first made man,
   Having a glasse of blessings standing by;
   Let us (said he) poure on him all we can:
   Let the worlds riches, which dispersed lie,
   Contract into a span.
   So strength first made a way;
   Then beautie flow'd, then wisdome, honour, pleasure:
   When almost all was out, God made a stay,
   Perceiving that alone, of all his treasure,
   Rest in the bottome lay.
   For if I should (said he)
   Bestow this jewell also on my creature,
   He would adore my gifts in stead of me,
   And rest in Nature, not the God of Nature:
   So both should losers be.
   Yet let him keep the rest,
   But keep them with repining restlesnesse:
   Let him be rich and wearie, that at least,
   If goodnesse leade him not, yet wearinesse
   May tosse him to my breast." ■